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ABSTRACT 
 
Within the global justice debate the demandingness objection is primarily aimed at utilitarian theorists who defend 
a version of the ‘optimizing principle of beneficence’ to deal with the problem of global poverty. The problem of 
demandingness, however, is hardly ever raised within the context of the dominant institutional theories of global 
justice that see severe poverty as a human rights violation. Nor are the fundamental underlying questions posed by 
many of these theorists. Which specific responsibilities do individual moral agents have regarding institutional 
and structural forms of injustice (1)? Which political spheres, organized public spaces, or political practices are 
necessary to create a setting in which these responsibilities can be discharged (2)? Does a ‘defensible and 
psychologically feasible conception of responsibility’ (Scheffler 2002, 62) exist that is restrictive – yet demanding 
– enough to deal with the complex challenges of our globalizing age (3). This paper addresses questions (1) and 
(3) on the basis of a critical analysis of Iris Marion Young’s social connection theory of responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Within the global justice debate the demandingness objection is primarily aimed at utilitarian 
theorists who defend a version of the ‘optimizing principle of beneficence’ to deal with the 
problem of global poverty. According to such an interactional principle we – citizens of rather 
affluent societies – are required ‘to keep benefiting others until the point where further efforts 
would burden us as much as they would help the others.’ (Murphy 2000, 6) Peter Singer’s 
strong version of the principle of preventing bad occurrences is a case in point. ‘If it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening’, he famously claimed in Famine, Affluence 
and Morality, ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we 
ought, morally, to do it.’ (1972, 231) 
 It is no surprise that the demands of such a principle are seen by many as excessive. 
Intuitively we feel that there is a limit ‘to how great a sacrifice morality, or at least a principle 
of beneficence, can legitimately demand of agents.’ (Murphy 1993, 273) Spending almost all 
our time and money on the battle against poverty and other forms of global wrongs would 
reduce us to mere agents ‘of the universal satisfaction system’ (Williams 1973, 118) and prevent 
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us from having any ground projects or personal relationships. Careful reflection is therefore 
needed on the ‘moral demands of affluence’. These demands should neither be too extreme nor 
too relaxed.  
 The problem of demandingness, however, is scarcely raised within the context of the 
dominant institutional theories of global justice that see severe poverty as a form of injustice or 
human rights violation and present us with a ‘non-restrictive conception of morality’.2 Nor, and 
this is a major deficit, are the fundamental underlying questions posed by many of these 
theorists. Which specific responsibilities do individual moral agents have regarding institutional 
and structural forms of injustice (1)? Which political spheres, organized public spaces, or 
(democratic) political practices are necessary to create a setting in which these responsibilities 
can be discharged (2)? 
 At first sight it is unsurprising that these questions and the issue of demandingness are 
largely neglected. Different reasons can be given for why this is so. We will mention only two. 
Unlike interactional theories – such as Singer’s – institutional theories do not address the 
problem of global poverty in terms of the ethical responsibilities of individual agents but in 
terms of the fairness or justice of institutional schemes. The main issue is what kind of justice-
relevant connections arise on the global level and what sort of institutional reforms are needed 
to right the wrongs of global poverty and other forms of deprivation and domination. Individual 
responsibility for justice is not an important part of this picture. This presumption is further 
reinforced by the fact that many theorists implicitly or explicitly assume that states and 
international organizations – and to a lesser extent private nongovernmental organizations and 
transnational corporations – are the principle (sometimes only) agents responsible for 
discharging responsibilities of global justice. It is the government’s job to address global 
injustices and not that of individual actors.  
 On further consideration, however, it is not so clear that institutional theorists can avoid 
questions related to the responsibilities for justice of individual moral agents. Take for example 
Thomas Pogge’s work on global poverty. Although he argues that the ‘the citizens and 
governments of the wealthy societies (…) significantly contribute to the persistence of severe 
poverty and thus share institutional moral responsibility for it.’ (2002, 115), he is primarily 
focused on what governments and international organizations can do to change the rules of the 
global economic order; such as the rules for global trade or intellectual property rights. Citizens 
should hold their representatives accountable for the results of international negotiations and 
press their governments for international reforms, but Pogge does not specify what these 
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responsibilities specifically entail, how demanding they are, nor whether all citizens are 
responsible to the same degree. 
 The object of the debate on global justice, moreover, almost directly leads to similar 
questions regarding individual responsibilities. The debate, after all, has shifted our attention 
from the sphere of ‘small-scale interactions, with clearly demarcated lines of causation, among 
independent individual agents’ (Scheffler 2011, 39), to one of great institutional complexity 
and ‘complex causal chains’ (Ashford 2003b, 109) between individual and institutional agents. 
Although this new globalized politico-economic reality complicates the attribution of 
individual responsibility – ascribing responsibility becomes very difficult if we cannot 
determine ‘who did what to whom’ – this does not imply that the question of individual 
responsibility for justice is off the table.  
 At least three fundamental questions, therefore, need to be raised, that receive little 
attention within the dominant institutional models of global justice. The first two are the ones 
mentioned above regarding the specific responsibilities of individual moral agents and the 
political context for discharging these responsibilities. The third is whether there is a ‘defensible 
and psychologically feasible conception of responsibility’ (Scheffler 2002, 62) that is restrictive 
– yet demanding – enough to deal with the complex challenges of our globalizing age (3). 
 Given that answering these questions in a satisfying way would demand a 
comprehensive theory of justice, responsibility and demandingness, this paper will only address 
parts of questions (1) and (3). It will do this on the basis of a critical analysis of the social 
connection theory of responsibility that Iris Marion Young developed in Responsibility for 
Justice (2011). Unlike many institutional theories of global justice, Young does develop a 
‘conceptual tool for thinking about individual responsibility in relation to structural social 
processes’ (2011, 27). Unfortunately, however, she neither succeeds in clearly reconstructing 
the different political demands that are implied in her conception of individual responsibility, 
nor does she succeed in countering the demandingness objection. This article will give such a 
reconstructing and show why the issue of demandingness should be taken more seriously by 
those institutional theories of global justice that see global poverty as the effect of complex 
global institutional or social processes.  
 The general framework of Young’s social connection model and a reconstruction of the 
political responsibilities it entails will be the object of section 2 of this paper. Section 3 and 4 
start with two general strategies for sidestepping the demandingness objection: by either 
claiming that individuals can simply opt-out of unjust social connections or by arguing that it 
is the government’s job to address global structural injustices. Section 5 discusses a third 
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strategy: limiting the force of the demandingness objection by focusing on ‘responsibilities for 
justice’ instead of ‘duties of justice’. All three strategies to sidestep the demandingness 
objection, as it will turn out, are unpersuasive. A more promising (but not fully convincing) 
way of dealing with this objection is by developing a system of differentiated responsibilities. 
Section 7, therefore, critically analyzes the four guidelines that Young describes for reasoning 
about the actions that are necessary to undermine structural injustices. Section 6 introduces this 
strategy by taking a closer look at two of the main reasons why institutional theories of global 
justice are open to the demandingness objection: external circumstances and the grounds for 
attributing responsibilities for justice. Section 8, finally, draws some general conclusions and 
gives some suggestions for moving forward. 
 
2. A social connection theory of responsibility 
 
In Responsibility for Justiceand earlier work on global justice Young tried to accomplish two 
aims. First, to argue that ‘obligations of justice can arise between persons by virtue of the social 
processes that connect them’ (2006, 102) instead of on the basis of political membership, a 
background structure or humanity in general. Second, to reflect on the ‘responsibilities moral 
agents may be said to have in relation to such global social processes.’ (2006, 102) Let’s briefly 
look at both claims before we try to infer what specific kind of responsibilities can follow from 
structural injustice and how demanding these responsibilities can become. 
 
2.1 Structural injustices and social connection 
 
When do responsibilities of justice arise? What is the appropriate context for justice-relevant 
connections? Young rejects two standard answers: (a) responsibilities for justice arise from 
common membership in a nation-state; and (b) responsibilities for justice arise from the fact 
that we are part of a global institutional order. Both replies are too narrow. The first model 
because it unduly restricts the context of justice to the domestic sphere. The second because the 
idea of a global institutional order or basic structure is too much focused on the actions of legal 
and regulatory institutions, and disregards the importance of social connections. Injustice does 
not necessarily need to be the result of unjust laws or the wrongful acts of individuals but can 
also be caused by ‘everyday habits and chosen actions’ (2011, 71); like buying clothes and 
food. 
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 Such a strong enlargement of the scope of justice can already be found in Justice and 
the Politics of Difference (1990). In this book Young argues that oppression:  
 
persists in our society partly through interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and 
stereotypes, and group-related feelings of nervousness or aversion. Group oppressions 
are enacted in this society not primarily in official laws and policies but in informal, 
often unnoticed practices of everyday interaction and evaluation, aesthetic judgments, 
and the jokes, images, and stereotypes pervading in mass media. (Young 1990, 148) 
 
In Responsibility for Justice, however, Young specifically focuses on ‘structural injustices’. 
These are injustices that are ‘distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the 
repressive policies of a state’ (2011, 52). Structural injustices arise from the:  
 
accumulated outcomes of the actions of the masses of individuals enacting their own 
projects, often uncoordinated with many others. The combination of actions affects 
the conditions of the actions of others, often producing outcomes not intended by any 
of the participating agents. (2011, 62-63) 
 
Young only mentions a few examples of structural injustice on the global scale: sweat shops, 
global warming and financial crises. These examples, however, do give a general impression 
of what kind of injustice she has in mind and in what way her notion of responsibility differs 
from the traditional ideas of moral responsibility and legal liability (which not only imply some 
form of causality and volition, but also awareness and intention). 
 
2.2 A political type responsibility 
 
Young’s second aim, as we said before, is to develop a conception of individual responsibility 
in relation to these structural injustices. Such a responsibility derives from social connection 
and is political in nature. As such it should be distinguished from interactional forms of 
responsibility like ethical consumerism (buying sweatshop-produced clothing, using green-
electricity or drinking Starbucks coffee etc.). Although Young does not deny that individual 
consumer-based action is an important instrument to deal with certain types of moral wrong, 
she does claim that an aggregation of disparate individual actions is not the best way to address 
global structural injustice (cf. Gould 2009, 201). The kind of responsibility that Young is after 
is a shared kind of responsibility – a responsibility ‘I personally bear, but not bear it alone’ 
(2011, 110) – that can only be taken up by means of collective action. Following Arendt she 
defines politics or the political as a ‘public communicative engagement with others for the sake 
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of organizing our relationships and coordinating our actions most justly.’ (2011, 112) So the 
only way to discharge this kind of responsibility is through joining with others. 
 A second important characteristic of her conception of individual responsibility is that 
it is forward-looking. Instead of trying to attribute guilt or fault for past actions, Young focuses 
on the responsibility individual and collective agents might have ‘in relation to current events 
and in relation to their future consequences’. (2011, 92) It is not difficult to find examples of 
forward-looking responsibilities in daily life. Marriage, for example, implies the responsibility 
of mutual support and fidelity. And having children implies educating and caring for them. 
(Richardson 1999, 218) The specific form of forward-looking responsibility that Young has in 
mind, is the obligation ‘to join with others who share that responsibility in order to transform 
the structural processes to make their outcomes less unjust’ (2011, 96). Or in more general 
terms, it is the ‘responsibility to be political’. (2011, 92) In connection with the idea of 
‘structural injustice’, however, it is important to keep in mind two things. First of all that this 
forward-looking responsibility arises because of past and current interactions within complex 
social structures. So in that sense, Young’s forward-looking responsibility is always based on 
some form of outcome responsibility – however minimal – and cannot avoid looking backward. 
Secondly, that this backward-looking component of her social connection model complicates 
several strategies to counter the demandingness objection, such as opting for ‘responsibilities 
for justice’ instead of ‘duties of justice’. 
 
2.3 The stance of the deliberative democrat and the political activist 
 
But what could such a responsibility for justice precisely entail for individual moral agents? 
Young doesn’t present us with a set of clear guidelines or structured account. Instead she only 
presents her readers with some general clues in her analysis of Hannah Arendt’s concept of 
responsibility and her discussion of sweatshops and global labor justice. These clues, however, 
are rather disparate and disorganized. One way of organizing them – probably the most 
productive one – is on the basis of a distinction that Young made in an earlier paper regarding 
the ideal of the good citizen: the contrast between the stance of the ‘deliberative democrat’ and 
the ‘political activist’ (Young 2001). Both stances imply a different and sometimes conflicting 
interpretation of political engagement. 
 The ideal of inclusive public deliberation is at the heart of the deliberative democratic 
model of citizen virtue and forms the basis for democratic legitimacy. Laws and policies ‘ought 
to be made by processes that bring all the potentially affected parties or their representatives 
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into a public deliberative process’. As such, this ideal not only guides citizens in their evaluation 
of political processes and their interaction with those ‘with whom [they] disagree or those with 
whom [their] interests initially conflict in public setting’, but it also gives them ample reason 
to advocate ‘processes and action to implement deliberative procedures in actually existing 
democracy.’ (Young 2001, 672) 
 On a very general level, the stance of the political activist is not all that different. Both 
the deliberative democrat and the activist try to promote social justice and claim that political 
engagement should ‘communicate specific ideas to the wide public’. (2001, 676) The political 
activist, however, does not accept that the best (and only) way to address harm and injustice is 
on the basis of public deliberation within the framework of already existing political processes. 
These processes, after all, are often marked by deep structural inequalities: 
 
the normal workings of the social economic and political institutions in which he 
dwells’, after all, ‘enact or reproduce deep wrongs – some laws or policies have unjust 
effects, or social and economic structures cause injustice (…) and so on. (2001, 673) 
 
The main focus of the activist is therefore on interest group politics (like sit-ins, boycotts, 
leafleting, and demonstrations) as a means to counter these structural inequalities. 
 Both the deliberative democratic and the activist stance seem to be at the background of 
Young’s conception of political responsibility. Individual moral agents participating in 
processes of structural injustice have the political responsibility to mobilize, contest and create 
new sites for public deliberation. Systematizing the remarks found in her work on sweatshops 
and global labor justice I come to the following list of four components of what a political 
responsibility regarding unjust structural processes might entail: 
 
i) Acquiring knowledge: Considering that individual actors can participate in processes of 
structural injustices without intending these results or even knowing about them, one of the first 
responsibilities is to acquire knowledge about the specific connections between their actions, 
institutions and the fate of distant strangers. It is only on the basis of this information that 
discussion of problems like hunger and domination can be initiated, that other ‘citizens’ can be 
mobilized to reform unjust structural processes, and that governments and international 
organizations can be criticized for not addressing these issues. 
 
ii) Mobilizing others: Given that participating in unjust structural processes generates a political 
responsibility, individual moral agents must be willing to persuade others of the fact that some 
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policies, interests and social connections will have ‘unjust or harmful aspects or consequences’ 
(Young 2001, 672). In addition they have the responsibility to join with others ‘to organize 
collective action to reform [unjust] structures’ (2011, 112) and to convince governments and 
international institutions that global structural injustices need to be addressed; for instance by 
‘pressuring or cajoling policy makers to serve’ universal interests. (Young 2001, 674) 
 
iii) Contesting and monitoring: Considering that within the real world of politics, processes of 
deliberation and decision-making are often characterized by deep structural inequalities – such 
as the significant political power that structurally dominant segments of society often have – 
individual moral actors have the political responsibility to watch, contest and monitor the 
actions of the main political actors (like states and international organizations). 
 
iv) Creating new deliberative forums: If these three categories of political responsibilities cannot 
be discharged within existing national or global organized entities (which seems likely 
considering the problem of structural inequality and the lack of a full-fledged public sphere at 
the global level), individual moral agents have the responsibility to create and maintain new 
sites and processes of deliberation and contestation. (Young 2001, 672)  
 
How these four components relate to the interactional responsibility that individual moral 
agents have as consumers (such as buying fair trade products) or the responsibilities of states 
or other institutional actors remains to be seen. And which of these four is the most important 
one is also an open question. It all depends on how deep structural inequalities at the global 
level are, whether sufficient deliberative sites are available to give both the ‘perpetrators’ of 
injustice and the ‘victims’ a political voice, and how difficult it is to initiate change. These four 
components, however, do give us a general idea of what responsibilities for justice might entail 
for institutional theories of global justice that share – as most of these theories do – the 
importance of inclusive public reason and claim that many global injustices are caused by 
institutional structures and social processes. 
 Combined with Young’s first aim of enlarging the traditional scope of the context of 
justice-relevant connections the question will, however, immediately be raised whether the 
individual agent will not be hopelessly overwhelmed by these political responsibilities. There 
are, after all, many structural processes we participate in through our actions (both at the local 
and global level). Sometimes we are well aware of the fact that these processes lead to unjust 
outcomes, sometimes we don’t even know that we are implicated in unjust processes. Judith 
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Lichtenberg expresses this very aptly: ‘Every bite we eat! Every purchase we make! To not do 
these things, to know what to do instead, all this can encroach on our autonomy at least as 
oppressively as any duties of aid or beneficence’ (2010, 560). 
 One way out of this dilemma is for Young to deny that that either the stance of the 
deliberative democrat or the activist embodies the ideal of the always engaged citizen. Citizens 
don´t always have ‘to engage discursively with all interests and social segments, reasonably 
expressing opinions and criticizing others´. (2001, 688) Young may be right regarding the ideal 
setting of a more or less reasonably just democratic society – although even in this case the 
problem of the practical feasibility of large-scale deliberative practices can be legitimately 
raised – but things look altogether different when we discuss a non-ideal context in which 
individual agents are implicated in global structural injustices. Being implicated in a context in 
which institutional actors do not (or not sufficiently) address these injustices individual agents 
cannot deny their responsibilities for justice. 
 Young in fact recognizes that the demandingness objection will immediately be raised 
once readers realize that ‘all who participate by their actions in the structural processes that 
produce unjust outcomes share responsibility for working to alter those processes’. (2003, 40) 
Although these burdens might be seen by many as unfair because most citizens of affluent 
societies probably never intended the bad outcomes of their joint actions, because they might 
have been acting ‘within institutional rules and according to practices that most people regard 
as morally acceptable’ (Young 2011, 95) or because they are not always in the best position to 
change things, these injustices still need to be addressed. 
 The demandingness objection can, therefore, not so easily be brushed aside. How to 
respond to such an objection? How to avoid making ‘unusually heavy demands of individual 
moral agents’ in ‘a world where human misery and suffering exist on a vast scale, and where 
acts that are atrocities on any plausible view come to our attention’ (Scheffler 1986, 531)? In 
the next three sections three general strategies will be discussed that might be used to sidestep 
this objection: claiming that citizens can disconnect from unjust structural processes altogether 
(section 3), shifting the responsibility of citizens to their states (section 4) and claiming that 
responsibilities for justice – in contrast to duties of justice – leaves considerable room for 
personal discretion (section 5). These strategies, however, are unconvincing. 
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3. Why not opt-out? 
 
Can individual moral agents simply escape their political responsibilities to undermine 
structural injustices by withdrawing their participation in unjust global processes and 
institutions; perhaps by only buying fair-trade goods or maybe even living the life of self-
sustained hermits? Although Young rejects this opt-out strategy she, strangely enough, does 
take it in consideration. Regarding the option of not buying certain goods, she argues the 
following:  
 
They choose not to buy certain products or brands, which they have reason to think 
are manufactured under unjust conditions. But when such a boycott is the act of a 
single individual, it has no effect on those conditions. And it is nearly impossible in 
the contemporary world for a person to remove herself from any implication in 
structures that produce injustice. To the extent that this implication is a ground of 
political responsibility, then, the responsibility cannot be escaped by withdrawal; it 
has to be taken up. (Young 2004, 386) 
 
We add ‘strangely enough’ because Young’s forward-looking responsibility is essentially about 
preventing future wrongs and changing past wrongs (Hahn 2009, 62). We have an obligation, 
according to Young, ‘to join with others who share that responsibility in order to transform the 
structural processes to make their outcomes less unjust. (2011, 96) By disconnecting – assuming 
that this can be done – there is no guarantee that this goal will be reached; that future structural 
injustices will be prevented. So the main reason why escaping responsibility by withdrawing is 
not an option is not merely because we cannot avoid being implicated, but because we have an 
obligation to change precisely those unjust structural processes that we are part of and directly 
or indirectly helped to sustain. 
 The same type of criticism, although in a stronger form, also applies to Pogge’s work. 
Take the following quote from World Poverty and Human Rights: 
 
I might honor my negative duty, perhaps, through becoming a hermit or an emigrant, 
but I could honor it more plausibly by working with others toward shielding the 
victims of injustice from the harms I help produce or, if this is possible, toward 
establishing secure access through institutional reform. (2002, 66) 
 
 If ‘I helped sustain a social order’ in which many people do not have ‘secure access to the 
objects of their human rights’ (2002, 66) it seems odd – to say the least – to argue that we can 
honor our negative duties (and its positive component of reforming unjust institutions) ‘through 
becoming a hermit or an emigrant’. Such a course of action is only a legitimate option if we 
never helped to create or sustain such an order in the first place. If participating in and 
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supporting unjust structural processes is the ground for attributing either forward-looking 
(Young) or backward-looking responsibilities (Pogge), there is no reason to either avoid taking 
up these political responsibilities or reflect on their content. 
 
4. Institutional and individual responsibilities 
 
A second strategy to deny the demandingness objection and some of the more difficult questions 
related to the range of political responsibilities of individual moral agents is to claim that states 
and international institutions like the WTO or ILO are the primary agents for social change and 
consequently bear sole or most of the responsibility for countering structural injustices at the 
global level. Although there is some truth in this claim – structural injustices and inequalities 
need long-term and institutional solutions – it is too one-sided and far from convincing. To 
explain why this is the case, it is helpful to look at Young’s critique of Robert Goodin’s 
discussion of the ‘not my job excuse’. This is one of the two excuses that Goodin mentions for 
why people – even though they accept that certain things are unjust and need to be changed – 
still refuse to do the right thing. Someone needs to fight global injustices, people argue, but it 
is not their responsibility to be that specific someone. (1995, 29) 
 What makes the ‘not my job excuse’ so interesting is that it might let the individual 
agent off the hook but that it has the effect, as Goodin argues, ‘of putting collective moral agents 
such as the state on it, in their stead’. (1995, 28) What is needed in situations where individual 
agents accept that injustice exists but refuse to do anything about it, is some form of formal 
organization and coordinated social action. Of course the state is not the only collective agent 
capable of addressing structural injustices, but in our current political constellation the state is 
still the most powerful one. 
 Although Goodin’s analysis of the ‘not my job problem’ does not imply that individual 
agents have no responsibilities3, Young does criticize him for being too much focused on the 
importance of the state as a moral agent. Goodin’s analysis of the ‘not my job excuse’, 
according to her, suffers from two important shortcomings. First of all, it downplays the fact 
that the state’s ability to transform structural processes depends to a great degree on ‘the active 
support of its citizens in that endeavor’. (2011, 169) Citizens must be willing to pay for the 
actions that the state undertakes in their name. 
 A second problem with Goodin’s analysis is that it insufficiently recognizes that 
struggles between states and international institutions often form the cause of certain structural 
injustices. That is why we need citizens, activist organizations, private NGO’s etc. to make: 
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demands on state and international institutions to develop policies that limit the ability 
of powerful and privileged actors to do what they want without much regard to its 
cumulative effect on others, and to promote the well-being of less powerful and 
privileged actors. (Goodin 2011, 151) 
 
Although Young, according to some4, tends to overemphasize the standpoint of the activist 
citizen and the importance of informal modes of collective action, she has a point when it comes 
to the question of the proper agents for social change. Even though states and international 
institutions are powerful agents we cannot discard the importance of individual responsibility 
in relation to global structural processes or with regard to the structural inequalities that are 
often characteristic of social, economic and political institutions. The ‘not my job excuse’, 
therefore, cannot be used to simply sidestep questions regarding the nature of individual 
responsibilities for justice. 
 There is an interesting paradox at work here. On the one hand we need to realize that 
conflicts between the ‘moral point of view’ and the ‘point of view of the individual agent’ 
(Scheffler 1992, 4) more easily surface and gain in strength under unjust political conditions. 
‘In a seriously unjust society’, Scheffler rightly claims, ‘conflicts between moral requirements 
and the interests of the individual agent may be extremely difficult to avoid (1992, 139). That 
is why in the simple case of domestic relations we need a just and well-ordered society to limit 
these conflicts and establish a better fit between morality and the interests of the individual. On 
the other hand, however, we should not forget that in a globalizing world characterized by a 
great variety of structural injustices and inequalities such a fit would not only require a just and 
well-ordered world society but also individual moral agents with the political responsibility and 
the political will to create and sustain such an institutional context.  
 
5. Responsibility instead of duty 
 
Given that ‘citizens’ can never fully transfer their responsibility for remedying structural 
injustices to states and other organizations, and given that ‘withdrawal’ is not on option, is there 
a third strategy to sidestep the objection of demandingness? One could claim – like Young does 
– that structural injustices lead to some form of liability for those actors that directly violate 
duties of justice – like in the case of sweatshops the ‘factory owners and managers who violate 
local labor laws’ (2011, 131) – but only to responsibilities for justice for all those individual 
moral agents who merely buy their cloths from retailers who do business with these sweatshops 
or are in others ways implicated in unjust social processes. Duties and responsibilities, after all, 
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lead to different demands on individual agents5. Responsibilities leave moral agents far more 
room for their own personal projects and interests.  
 Both duties and responsibilities prescribe certain types of acts or behavior and have the 
same general form: ‘A ought to see it that X’; where ‘X’ refers to some state of affairs 
(Goodin1986, 142). The main difference between both, however, is that whereas duties 
prescribe a specific action that A ought to do or refrain from doing to produce X responsibilities 
do not refer to specific actions. The difference between duties and responsibilities, in that sense, 
seems to be similar to the distinction that Kant makes in The Metaphysics of Morals between 
narrow and wide obligations or perfect and imperfect duties. Regarding imperfect or wide duties 
Kant writes the following: 
 
if the law can prescribe only the maxims of actions, not actions themselves, this is a 
sign that it leaves playroom (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) 
the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and 
how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty (6, 390)6. 
 
The fact that imperfect duties leave a certain amount latitude for free choice when compared to 
perfect duties, however, does not imply that they are any less binding. Or, to use Young’s 
phrasing: although responsibilities are ‘no less obligatory’ than duties, responsibilities are 
‘more open as to what actions [they call] for’ and leave the agent more discretionary power. ‘It 
is up to the agents who have a responsibility’, according to Young, ‘to decide what to do to 
discharge it within the limits of other moral considerations.’ (2011, 143) 
 To what extent can the distinction between duties and responsibilities be used to sidestep 
the demandingness objection? It all depends on the circumstances to which these obligations 
apply in combination with the question whether a certain amount of playroom merely applies 
to the ‘when’ and ‘how to comply’ with imperfect duties and responsibilities, or also to the 
‘how much/how far’. If latitude does not extend to the ‘how much’ or ‘how far’ imperfect duties 
and responsibilities can become very demanding (Ackeren and Sticker 2015, 78) External 
circumstances, moreover, can also cause the latitude to shrink and make responsibilities and 
imperfect duties more stringent and demanding (Walla 2015, 736-736). Think about emergency 
cases where a child is drowning in a pond or where a neighbor is in dire need for food 
 So the most important way in which the distinction between duties and responsibilities 
might help to sidestep the demandingness objection is if responsibilities for justice do not apply 
to extreme circumstances (i) or when they not only imply an openness with regard to when and 
how these obligations are taken up (i.e. what precise actions to take, such as boycotting certain 
products or supporting social movements), but also to how far or even whether these 
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responsibilities should be taken up (ii). Both conditions, however, cannot apply to Young’s 
social connection model or institutional theories of global justice like Pogge’s.  
 At some points in her work Young seems to defend a wider interpretation of the latitude 
of responsibilities: ‘We who share responsibility ought to take action, but it is up to us to decide 
what is reasonable for us to do, given our abilities and our particular circumstances.’ (2011, 
143) Responsibilities, in this sense, are indeed like imperfect duties because they leave room 
for considerable personal discretion and can be overridden by other maxims of duty. Yet at 
other times Young merely claims that responsibilities are ‘more open as to what actions it calls 
for’. (2011, 143) In that sense ‘carrying out responsibilities is not a matter of mere beneficence’. 
(2004, 379)  
 The wider interpretation of the openness of responsibilities, however, doesn’t square 
well with her initial premise that the responsibilities of individual moral agents arise precisely 
because they participate in unjust structural processes. Young’s forward-looking responsibility 
for justice, after all, is always grounded in a backward-looking responsibility for injustice. 
These global structural injustices and inequalities form the circumstances to which the 
responsibilities for justice apply. Although it is difficult, as Young claims, ‘to identify how the 
actions of one particular individual, or even one particular collective agent, such as a firm, has 
directly produced harm to other specific individuals’ (2011, 96) this indeterminacy mainly 
shows that the liability model might not be an appropriate tool for all social and political 
contexts. It does not, however, straightaway lead to the conclusion that individual moral agents 
are morally speaking free to decide ‘how far’ to deal with their political responsibility. 
 A similar ambiguity as in Young’s work can be found in an interesting article by 
Elizabeth Ashford (2006). In this article Ashford argues for ‘considerable latitude’ with regard 
to the fulfillment of the ‘duty not to collaborate in unjust institutions’. She writes the following:  
 
The way in which we support institutional reform is open, and it is also open which 
particular harms we should seek to oppose or compensate for (…) Agents thus have 
considerable latitude in deciding which and how many of the harms in which they are 
implicated through their participation in social institutions they should try to prevent 
or counteract or redress (2006, 232). 
 
This latitude, in other words, does not only apply to the specific measures individual agents 
take to fulfil their duties but also to the degree to which they fulfil them. At the same time, 
however, and this is also a claim Young makes, ‘right-holders have a claim against every 
affluent agent who is not doing enough’ (2006, 234) which implies that there is a non-subjective 
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standard for determining when individual moral agents have discharged their responsibilities to 
a sufficient degree. 
 So focusing on ‘responsibilities for justice’ instead of ‘duties of justice’ does not help 
us to sidestep the demandingness objection within our current political landscape. 
Responsibilities for justice will only become less stringent and demanding if we have ‘just 
political institutions [that] create favorable conditions for moral agency’ (Walla 2015, 742). 
 
6. External circumstances and structural injustice 
 
To further understand why theories of global justice that focus on responsibilities for justice 
(like Young’s) – let alone institutional theories that focus on duties of justice (like Pogge’s) – 
cannot escape dealing with the issue of demandingness, it is helpful to take a closer look at two 
of the four general responses to demandingness that Scheffler distinguishes in ‘Morality’s 
Demands and Their Limits’ (1986). The first is to claim that such a moral theory cannot be 
acceptable and needs to be replaced by a less demanding one. If ‘ought implies can’ we should 
dismiss theories that lay down rules and principles that simply cannot be observed by non-
heroic moral agents. The second response focuses on limits to the scope or pervasiveness of 
morality, on the acts which can or cannot be subject to moral justification and assessment. As 
long as moral theories do not subject ‘certain areas of human life (...) to moral assessment or 
moral demands’ (1986, 531), according to this response, they are acceptable. 
 Whereas the first two responses accept the claim that the demands of morality can be 
‘limited by considerations having to do with the individual agent’s psychology and well-being’ 
(1986, 531) the last two responses follow a different strategy. Both are rooted in the view that 
‘sees morality as more radically disengaged from the standpoint of the individual agent’ 
(Scheffler 1992, 27). These responses accept that morality can demand a great deal from us but 
claim that this will primarily affect either the status of morality or the status of us as moral 
agents, but not the content of moral theories. Given that we are specifically interested in the 
different strategies that proponents of institutional theories of global justice have of either 
avoiding the demandingness objection or restricting the demands of morality, we will leave the 
third and fourth responses for what they are. 
 Are the first and second responses open to Young’s social connection model or 
proponents of institutional theories of justice like Pogge? The second isn’t, but the first might. 
The second response, recall, claims that some actions or areas of human life are beyond the 
scope of moral justification. Two types of acts are often mentioned in this regard. First, acts 
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that are ‘too trivial to besubject to moral evaluation’ (1986, 532), like brushing your teeth. 
Second, acts whose non-performance ‘would be extremely costly, either to the agent himself or 
to someone dear to him’ (1986, 532), like Bernard Williams’ example of a man who is faced 
with the dilemma of being able to save only one of two people (his wife and a stranger). 
Claiming that it is morally permissible for the man to save his wife is, according to Williams, 
‘intolerably moralistic’. (Scheffler 1986, 533) 
 Scheffler argues that both examples give rise to the same critique. Claiming that an act 
is beyond the scope of moral evaluation ‘implicitly depends on an assessment not only of the 
act itself, but also of the consequences of the act, the alternatives available to the agent, and 
their consequences’ (1986, 534); an assessment which, according to Scheffler, appears 
‘indistinguishable from moral assessment’ (1986, 535). Perhaps we are brushing our teeth while 
at the exact same time someone is choking to death just outside the bathroom door. Or perhaps 
‘[t]he man's wife (…) is a notorious and sadistic mass murderer’ and the stranger ‘a brilliant 
and saintly medical researcher who (…) has just discovered a cure for cancer but has not yet 
had a chance to write it down’ (1986, 535).  
 Determining whether Scheffler is right in claiming that ‘no voluntary human action is 
in principle resistant to moral assessment’ (1986, 535) is perhaps relevant when we try to assess 
the plausibility of interactional theories of global justice that argue for a duty of beneficence to 
alleviate global poverty but not for institutional theories that focus on the political implications 
of being implicated in structural injustices. The starting point for Young and Pogge, after all, is 
precisely a violation of duties of justice. It is within this context that the question regarding the 
demandingness of responsibilities for justice arises. In that sense they are always already within 
the domain of the morally prohibited and the morally required. And as a consequence even less 
options are open to them to sidestep the objection of demandingness. The ground for attributing 
responsibilities for change and reform, in that sense, has an effect on its demandingness. 
 What about the first response? Can the demands of morality overburden ‘normal’ moral 
agents if we take into account their ‘psychology and well-being’? With regard to Singer’s 
‘optimizing principle of beneficence’ many critics have argued that they can. Above we have 
seen that the same can be said for some institutional theories of global justice and Young’s 
social connection model. The main problem with the first response, however, is determining 
when morality puts too heavy demands on normal moral agents. On the one hand, morality 
should be action-guiding and demanding. ‘A morality that was never prepared to make any 
demands’, Goodin rightly claims, ‘would be a pretty useless morality.’ (2009, 3) Individuals 
should be prepared to change their normal habits and ‘sacrifice a great deal of what reasonable 
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people regard as their normal self-interest for the sake of furthering justice’. (Young 2011, 123) 
On the other hand these demands should not be impossible to comply with. 
 But when are moral demands impossible to comply with? And can normal moral agents 
argue that they are overburdened as a consequence of meeting those obligations (such as the 
obligation to compensate for harms or reform unjust institutional or social structures) that 
follow from a violation of duties of justice? Responsibilities for justice, precisely because they 
are grounded in a violation of duties of justice, seem to leave less latitude in this regard than 
duties of beneficence although some theorists would argue that even stricter obligations than 
responsibilities for justice leave room for exemptions. Take for example Rawls’ description of 
the natural duties of justice in his A Theory of Justice (1971/1999):  
 
This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just 
institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist in the 
establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be 
done with little cost to ourselves (1999, 293-294). 
 
We are released from this duty to maintain and create just institutions, in other words,‘when the 
cost to ourselves is considerable’ (1999, 100).7 
 Rawls’ description of the natural duty of justice is one way of addressing the 
demandingness objection but it comes at the price of changing a duty of justice into a duty of 
virtue: no less obligatory but with more playroom for free choice regarding the ‘how far/how 
much'. One can, however, wonder whether this option would be open to Rawls in circumstances 
of global structural injustices. Extreme circumstances, as we saw above, can even make 
imperfect duties more ‘strict’ and limit the playroom for free choice. 
 External circumstances (like the needs of the global poor or a lack of just democratic 
global political institutions) in combination with the grounds for attributing responsibilities for 
justice (direct or indirect outcome responsibility for structural injustices and inequalities), in 
that sense, have a strong effect on the demandingness and content of these responsibilities. And 
this applies not only to Young’s social connection model but also to institutional theories of 
global justice like Pogge’s. What turns Pogge’s duty to reform into a relatively stringent 
obligation that cannot be easily overridden, is that it even more directly flows from outcome 
responsibility than Young’s responsibility for justice: violations of negative duties directly lead 
to duties of compensation and reform. 
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7. Differentiating responsibilities 
 
Some form of restriction of morality’s demands, however, seems to be necessary to make 
Young’s social connection model or institutional theories of global justice like Pogge’s 
plausible. But what strategy is suitable to restrict the demands of responsibilities for justice or 
duties to reform? Young introduces four guidelines for reasoning ‘about how to take action to 
try to undermine injustice’. (2011, 144) By presenting these four parameters (power, privilege, 
interest, and collectiveability) Young hopes to take into account the intuition that although all 
agents share in the responsibility for structural injustices, they can still have ‘different kinds 
and degrees of forward-looking responsibility’. (2011, 144) The main problem with these 
parameters of reasoning, however, is that they cannot fully avoid the charge that either all 
people can be held equally responsible for structural injustices (a) or that they might overburden 
precisely those agents that already try to fight structural injustices or are the victims of these 
injustices (b). Let’s briefly look at these parameters. 
 Within structural processes agents will occupy different social relations. Some will have 
more power to change structural processes; others will have a rather privileged position in 
relation to these processes. With regard to the global apparel industry, for example, the middle-
class in most western societies will have a privileged position. According to Young they not 
only ‘benefit from the large selection and affordable prices that retailers offer them’ (2011, 145) 
but they can also afford to change their habits. Unlike lower income clothing consumers they 
can very easily make that extra effort. 
 The criteria of ‘power’ and ‘privilege’, however, don’t necessarily lesser the 
responsibilities of the average citizen. Although large multinational designers and retailers 
‘have the power to pressure manufacturers to improve working conditions, monitor those 
conditions, and directly subsidize plant improvements’ (2011, 144-145), we still need 
consumers and political activists to push these multinationals to take up their responsibility. 
And this cannot always be easily done because these giant corporations, as Young also 
indicates, have an interest in perpetuating the status quo. So unless these multinationals take 
action, the burden will return to those agents who do not take up a position of institutional 
power within structural processes. 
 Something similar also applies to the criterion of ‘privilege’. Although middle-class 
consumers both profit from unjust structures and have the capacity to collectively call for a 
boycott of certain products, we should not forget that lower-income consumers also profit from 
the current global apparel and food industry and that they would probably not suffer ‘serious 
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deprivation’ (2011, 145) if they changed their habits. Eating less meat or buying less (but more 
expensive) clothing is an option for most citizens in affluent societies. In addition, many forms 
of political activism are open to all. 
 What about the last two parameters of reasoning (‘interest’ and ‘collective ability’)? 
Those agents whose interests ‘coincide with the responsibility for justice’ (2011, 145), 
according to Young, also share in the responsibility of challenging and eventually changing 
these processes. At first sight, this seems like a productive way of differentiating responsibility. 
Those who benefit from changes in the way the global apparel and food industry is organized 
have an extra responsibility when it comes to making these changes happen. On second thought, 
however, the parameter of ‘interest’ will primarily burden those actors that are either already 
try to change the way the global industry is organized (like members of NGO’s or political 
activists) or the victims of structural injustices (like the exploited workers in sweat shops). This 
seems counterintuitive. Take the example of the sweat shop workers. There are, of course, good 
reasons (such as avoiding paternalism) for involving actual and potential victims in ameliorative 
efforts. But we should not forget that the dominated and exploited are not in the best position 
to change oppressive systems. (cf. Gould 2009, 203) They often lack real opportunity for 
change. ‘Interest’ in that regard is not a perfect guiding principle for determining how the 
burdens of the forward-looking responsibility for justice should be distributed. 
 ‘Collective ability’ suffers from a similar fate. Political responsibility, as we discussed 
before, is a form of shared responsibility, a collective social project. People should ‘organize 
collectively to regulate or transform some aspect of their shared social conditions’. (2004, 377) 
Young, however, rightly points out that it is often very difficult to get ‘individuals and 
institutions organized in a new way.’ (2011, 147) That is why she argues that some agents are 
in a better position to initiate change than others. Some agents, for example, ‘can draw on the 
resources of already organized entities [such as unions, church groups, student groups or even 
stockholder organizations] and use them in new ways for trying to promote change’. (2011, 
147) Although Young is right in this regard, she seems to forget that most people in developed 
countries are not only part of many different organized entities – and in that sense will have the 
opportunity to initiate change – but that there are also many different unjust structural processes 
that need to be reformed. The real challenge is often to convince people within organized 
entities to initiate change and this requires having sufficient information about structural 
processes to guarantee that change will be effective. And with this we are back to the ideal of 
the citizen-activist; a role that is open to all. 
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 The fact that Young’s four parameters of reasoning do not provide us with a fully 
convincing answer to the demandingness objection, however, doesn’t imply that the strategy of 
developing a system of differentiated responsibilities isn’t a worthwhile endeavor to pursue. It 
mostly means that more work need to be done to determine ‘who needs to do what for whom’. 
Young’s parameters of reasoning, however, not only need to be reworked and refined but also 
supplemented with an account of the different connections between ethical consumerism, 
political consumerism (the ways in which consumers can use markets as ‘arena’s for politics’; 
cf. Stolle and Michelleti 2014), political activism and institutional responsibility. Within the 
context of global justice and trade, for example, different routes have been proposed to promote 
development and fight world poverty: free trade (removing protectionist laws and policies), 
fair trade (trading partnerships, ethical consumerism and limited forms of political 
consumerism) and proposals for a more comprehensive form of fairness in trade (preventing 
exploitation, promoting redistribution, changing the rules of the WTO etc.) The precise relation 
between these different routes and the obligations they entail for different institutional and 
individual agents, though, still needs to be determined. Are they mutually exclusive or mutually 
reinforcing means to reach some form of global justice? 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
Although Young has made quite some progress in developing a model of individual political 
responsibility in relation to structural injustices, a more comprehensive account needs to be 
given of the implications that this model has for theories of global justice and democracy. 
Arguing that political responsibility involves ‘joining with others to organize collective action 
to reform’ (2011, 112) the social and institutional structures that lead to global injustices is too 
general an answer. What we need to know – at least if we take the issue of demandingness 
seriously – is which specific obligations are entailed in the idea of responsibility for justice (1), 
how these obligations can be differentiated in such a way that the different roles and capabilities 
of individual actors are taken into account (2), and what the best political arena’s and practices 
are for discharging these responsibilities (3). How to answer these three questions? In section 
2.3 a preliminary answer was given to the first question on the basis of a reconstruction of the 
four general components of the idea of responsibility for justice: acquiring knowledge (a), 
mobilizing others (b), contesting and monitoring (c) and creating new deliberative forums (d). 
These four components, however, need to be further elaborated into a convincing account of 
political agency and activism. No attempt was made in this paper to answer the third question. 
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That would require a comprehensive account of the relationship between global justice and 
global democracy. 
 What about the issue of demandingness? Unlike Rawls’ definition of the natural duty 
of justiceYoung’s description of responsibility for justice does not contain the restriction ‘with 
little cost to ourselves’ (1999,294). External circumstances (a great number of global injustices) 
and the ground for attributing this responsibility (some form of outcome responsibility), in fact, 
make such a restriction difficult and immediately raise the problem of demandingness. Three 
strategies have been described and refuted to sidestep this problem: opting-out, shifting 
responsibilities to the state and emphasizing responsibilities instead of duties. A fourth strategy 
– at least if we take the psychology and well-being of individual agents seriously – seems more 
promising: differentiating responsibilities. To convincingly answer the second question, 
however, more needs to be said about the link between ethical consumerism, political 
consumerism, political activism and institutional responsibility 
 Does all this imply that the main claim of this paper is correct; i.e. that the 
demandingness objection should be taken more seriously within the context of the dominant 
institutional theories of global justice? Critics could reply that the main reason why Young’s 
theory of responsibility is open to the objection of demandingness is precisely because she 
overemphasizes the stance of the citizen activist and unnecessarily stretches the scope of justice 
to include individual participation in social processes that lead to structural injustices; injustices 
that are often not intended or foreseen by ‘any of the participating agents’ (Young 2011, 62-
63). Up to a certain point these critics are right. Young’s forward-looking responsibility casts a 
far wider net than institutional theories of global justice that are based on a liability form of 
outcome responsibility; like Pogge’s. But even these theories – at least in so far as their 
grounding empirical claim is correct; viz. that the governments and citizens of affluent societies 
are largely to blame for global poverty – cannot deny the importance of individual responsibility 
for justice and should address the issue of demandingness. Young, after all, convincingly argues 
that individual actors can and should be seen as agents of social change, actors that have a 
political responsibility to collectively monitor and watch political institutions. 
 Pogge’s ‘causal contribution thesis’ is of course one of the weak links of his liability 
based theory of global justice. There are two important complicating factors:  
 
Empirically, it is extremely difficult to determine the main causes of global poverty 
as well as dubious that most world poverty is the effect of global institutions. 
Philosophically, even if the principle were true, the extent of “our” responsibility for 
global poverty is complicated by our diverse agency relationships to institutions. (Satz 
2005, 48) 
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Although this problem of indeterminacy does not necessarily discard his theory, it does show 
that first-order moral questions – which particular demands can legitimately be posed on 
individual actors – are difficult to adequately answer. At most we might only get a very general 
notion of who owes what to whom. But this is precisely one of the reasons why Young 
emphasizes the importance of a forward-looking type of responsibility with regard to structural 
injustices instead of one based on liability and blame. Young’s wider net, in that sense, actually 
does make sense. In the end, however, the remaining challenge is to further specify the political 
context for discharging these individual responsibilities and a way to differentiate them. 
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Notes 
1  Associate Professor of Legal Philosophy at the Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands. e-mail: 
r.tinnevelt@jur.ru.nl 
 
2 Scheffler (2001: 42). For exceptions see Ashford (2003a, 2003b and 2005) and Lichtenberg (2010). Outside the 
context of the global justice debate, however, some examples can be given, such as Ashford (2003) regarding 
contractualism, Swanton (2009) regarding virtue ethics and Walla (2015) and Ackeren and Sticker (2015) 
regarding Kants moral theory. It is, of course, tempting to mention institutional theorists that have socioeconomic 
human rights as the basis of their theories of global justice. The feasibility condition is often invoked in this regard. 
The demands of global justice principles should be able to be fulfilled in practice. (Compare Gilabert 2008) We 
should note, however, that the primary bearers of responsibility in discussions about welfare rights are states and 
not citizens. The feasibility objection is much broader than the demandingness objection. Although the literature 
on world, global or cosmopolitancitizenship, finally, does sometimes include the political responsibilities of 
individual moral agents, the general focus is on the moral idea that all human beings are part of a single community. 
For an interesting exception see Cabrera (2011). 
 
3 ‘[W]here doing the right thing requires coordinated social action, they are excused in the absence of mechanisms 
to provide that coordination. They are not excused in the presence of mechanisms to provide it. Nor are they 
excused from a duty to create and maintain those mechanisms to provide such coordination.’ (Goodin 1995, 36) 
See also Gould: ‘institutional problems require institutional solutions, though this is of course not to absolve 
individuals of their obligations to help create such institutions.’ (2009, 207) 
 
4 Gould for example argues that global corporations bear far more responsibility than Young acknowledges: ‘I 
have suggested that the difference in responsibility between global corporations and the exploited workers is not 
adequately conceived as a matter of degree’. (2009: 207)  
 
5 Here she follows Feinberg (1966) and Richardson (1999). 
 
6Page number refers to the Prussian Academy Edition of Kant’sComplete Works. 
 
7Criminal law, of course, also leaves room for excuses or mitigating factors when it comes to criminal acts. 
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